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From August 2011 until July 2012, the Global Strategic Maple Syrup Reserve in Québec was 
the site of a major food crime, as thieves siphoned off 9600 barrels (3,000 tonnes) of ‘liquid 
gold’ worth $18 million (CAD) for counterfeit sale across provincial and state borders, in 
what became known as the Great Maple Syrup Heist (Hamilton 2016).   Under cover of night, 
and thanks to securing access to some of the reserve’s key warehouses, the thieves replaced 
the syrup with water, volume-for-volume, which meant the switch was only discovered 
during an inspection many months later at one of the storage warehouses in Saint Louis de 
Blandford (Cohen 2016).  In the end, three men were charged with hefty fines and prison 
sentences, most notably the ‘ring-leader’ Richard Vallières, who was sentenced to 8 years in 
prison and fined $9.4 million (Toronto Star, 2018).   
Aside from the obvious sheer opportunism at play, the heist exposed a simmering war 
in the industry and has been characterized by some as a rebellious response to the quota 
controls established by the Federation of Québec Maple Syrup Producers which has, since 
1990, agreed with its members to hand over any surplus to ensure stability of supply and 
pricing. Some argue these quotas have spawned a black market leading to prohibition-style 
smuggling across borders, whereas the Federation defends its ‘collective marketing’ system 
(FPAQ 2018; Hamilton 2016; Skerritt 2016). This example highlights some of the tensions 
found within agri-food supply chains and systems, particularly those espousing norms, values 
and behaviours linked to the ‘moral economy of food’ (including, for example: an emphasis 
on food producers’ rights to secure livelihoods and fair pricing, and consumers’ demands for 
traceability and knowing where their food comes from) all of which are influenced by 
networks of power (Morgan 2007, p. 167). The heist exposes the uneasy co-existence of 
collective marketing, the quest for pure and natural products, the realities of global 
marketplaces and consumer demands amidst the neo-liberal desires among (some) producers 
for higher profits. Although the iconography and imagery of the story of maple syrup 
production still heavily draws upon a nostalgic era of the small farm producer, these events 
suggest a powerful lobby which, in the wake of the heist, was branded by some rogue 
producers as a maple syrup ‘cartel’ or ‘mafia’ (Skerritt 2016).   
 
How did things come this?  
 
This heist and the illicit rogues involved with the theft, thrust Canada’s maple syrup 
industry into a limelight of sorts, or at least earned it a place among the humorous backpages 
featuring quirky offbeat stories, and even inspired a (yet to be produced) film starring Jason 
Segel (Hertz 2013). Entertainment factor aside, however, a closer analysis of the origin and 
trajectory of the maple syrup industry – which was at first a maple sugar industry – reveals 
how its producers’ collective and cooperative approach is deeply rooted in efforts to stave off 
threats from adulteration and US competitors, establish federal purity legislation and create 
an appetite for maple products in domestic markets. Historical data and analysis reveal a long 
tradition of collective and cooperative power among North American maple producers, 
including national and provincial groups within Canada many of whom committed to norms 
and values that aimed to protect both producer and consumer. These associations that were 
formed in the early twentieth century adopted the practice of collective marketing and 
espoused values and norms that aimed to improve producers’ outputs, profits and increase 
their leverage with the federal government. In this paper I trace the historical evolution of 
Canadian (primarily Québec) maple syrup production and marketing focusing on the early 
twentieth century cooperative organizations that preceded the Federation. I consider where 
power and agency sits - and has shifted - within this supply chain, taking into consideration 
the implications for both producers and consumers. 
 
Cooperatives at the turn of the century  
Just over 100 years before the heist, the Canadian and Québec maple syrup industry was 
having a crisis of a different sort. The industry was originally focused primarily on maple 
sugar – the grainy powdery desiccated result of boiling off all of the maple sap, rather than 
leaving some moisture in the product resulting in a syrup. Although maple sap, sugar and 
syrup were known products and processes for centuries before, the maple sugar industry 
coalesced into a viable entity and business for farmers in the middle of the 19th Century. New 
export markets had opened up overseas in Britain and France, and south of the border in the 
US demand continued at a steady level. Maple sugar’s solid cake-like block form, sometimes 
referred to as ‘maple concrete’, made for easy transport and shipping in (for eating) the form 
of ‘dainty two-ounce cakes, neatly packed’ or (for cooking) in ‘one and two-pound bricks and 
in pails or tins of ten pounds’ (Perkins 1910). It increasingly found its way into Europe as 
more agents and importers cropped up in port cities like Liverpool, and also made for a 
nostalgic treat for Canadian soldiers posted abroad during WWI (Lefebvre 1916). Maple 
syrup was lesser known, and also seen as a luxury item to send to well-to-do friends in one or 
five gallon cans (Lynch 1910).  Requests came from importers and agents in England to the 
Canadian Deputy Minister of Agriculture about the potential of developing a demand for it 
among English consumers (Watson 1898).   
Maple syrup and sugar, both boiled down from the sap or ‘maple water’ that flows 
from the trees, can vary in supply each year depending upon the season and temperature of 
the spring thaw. This made for unpredictable yields depending on the season and climate 
which also affected production levels. During the spring harvest, trees are ‘tapped’ by boring 
a spout into the bark; the sap flows out and is collected in pails attached below. The pressure 
from the changing temperatures of the spring thaw, with cool nights and warm sunny days, 
causes sap to flow out of the tree, and drip steadily into the buckets. Buckets would be 
collected by farmers and poured into large barrels, and transported by sled or horse-drawn 
sleigh to the sugar shack or sugar camp for processing. Once in the sugar shack, sap was 
poured into large ‘modern’ evaporators and boiled off at the right temperature to create syrup, 
or, sugar, and approximately 40 L of sap was needed to make one litre of maple syrup 
(Spencer 1913 pp.14-44). 
Between 1851-1890, yearly production of maple sugar in Canada was steadily 
increasing (from 13.5 million lbs to 22.5 million lbs) but average yields began to decrease 
around the turn of the century and eventually dipped to less than 20 million lbs. As today, the 
bulk of production came from Québec (14.3 million lbs at the turn of the century), with lesser 
contributions from the neighbouring provinces of Ontario (5 million lbs), New Brunswick 
and Nova Scotia (approximately 0.5 million lbs combined) (Spencer 1913, p.12).     
This dip in production caused alarm among maple sugar producers. Like in many 
industries at the time, adulteration was rampant in maple sugar and syrup products. It was 
easy to mix maple sugar with products like beet and cane sugar, which undermined the profits 
of those who kept it pure, and in some instances it caused many farmers to give up entirely as 
it was often more profitable to chop down trees and sell the maple wood instead (Lefebvre 
1916).   Although some maple sugar aficionados believed consumer demand ‘should be 
higher’ (Grimm 1911) it was becoming increasingly difficult to compete with much cheaper 
cane sugar which had become more readily available and affordable globally as a regular 
household and dietary source of sweetness (Mintz 1986, p. 143).    
Near the turn of the century, consumers still saw maple sugar and syrup as a special 
luxury item, or many would not have even heard of the product; it was not an everyday staple 
item for the average household. Pure maple sugar and syrup producers were undercut and 
undermined by fake cheaper adulterated blends, often marked by some design ‘suggestive of 
the Canadian emblem’ which would leave a bad taste in the mouths of consumers trying it for 
the first time (Spencer 1913, p. 45). Those farmers who did have success on a small scale, 
would do so by producing a very high quality product, building up a reputation through word-
of-mouth and earning their profit through direct sale to consumers. Such farmers who had a 
good reputation would see prices in the range of $1.25 to $2.00 per gallon of syrup, and 12.5 
to 30 cents per pound of maple sugar (Spencer 1913, p.46). 
The global sugar market had thus become quite competitive, and this crisis of 
production prompted Québec producers to look south for inspiration and to consider the 
benefits of collective power. ‘In Union is Strength’ were the opening words of A.A. Carleton, 
the head of the Vermont Maple Sugar Makers’ Association, in his 1913 address to an 
audience of Canadian producers contemplating their existence given the threats to the 
industry (Spencer 1913, p. 46).  The Vermont group had existed for about 20 years prior, and 
was established for similar reasons, namely, that the industry was in decline due to the work 
of ‘mixers’ creating compound goods of lesser quality (Spencer 1913, p.54).   
The Pure Maple Sugar and Syrup Co-Operative Agricultural Association was established in 
January 1913 based in Waterloo, Québec, but open to producers in Ontario, New Brunswick 
and Nova Scotia as well. The Association had two patrons, and, as an indication of how much 
support existed at both the federal and provincial levels: Honourable Martin Burrell 
(Canadian Minster of Agriculture) and the Honourable J. E. Caron, Minister of Agriculture 
for the Province of Québec. The honorary president post was held by Professor John F. Snell, 
a chemist from MacDonald College in Québec who had been conducting research on 
methods of analysis for samples of maple syrup (Snell 1920). The President was M.F. 
Goddard based in Waterloo; Vice-President was Chas. F. Fisk of Abbotsford, and the 
Directors included John H. Grimm of Montreal, R.T. Brownlee of Hemmingford, J.A. Dupuis 
of DesAulnais. The Secretary-Treasurer role was held by Joseph Lefebvre (Spencer 1913, p 
52).     
For the annual fee of $1.00, producers could obtain a membership. The Association 
established clear objectives which would attempt to place maple products on both the 
political, legislative and social agendas in Canada. First and foremost, they aimed to put 
pressure on the governments of Québec and Canada to change the existing laws to stop 
adulteration and the sale of compound syrups using cheaper and lower quality items which 
were falsely branded as ‘maple’. Canada’s first piece of anti-adulteration legislation emerged 
in 1874 (‘An Act to Impose License duties on Compounds of Spirits; to amend the Act 
respecting the Inland Revenue; and to prevent the adulteration of Food, Drink and Drugs’) 
and was modelled on English laws (Heick 1991, p. 11; Ostry 2006, p 13). Although it had 
scope to make adulteration illegal for an array of products, it did not go far enough to define 
clear standards, grades or specifications for maple products. The association also wanted the 
government to assist in educating the so-called ‘agricultural classes’ in how to improve 
output and quality, and provide educational lectures, exhibitions and experimental stations to 
teach young people and consumers about maple sugar and syrup (Spencer 1913, p. 52).  
Finally, they wanted the provincial and federal governments to help the members get markets 
both at home and abroad for their products (Spencer 1913, p. 52).  
The Association strongly advocated the idea of ‘Cooperative marketing’ (See Figure 
1). In its first year, approximately 5,000 gallons of syrup and ‘a considerable amount of 
sugar’ was handled by the association, and ‘satisfactory prices’ were obtained (Spencer 1913, 
p. 47).  The aim was to do away with competition which drove prices down and put 
producers at a disadvantage.  At that time in Canada, it was estimated that there were 
approximately 55,000 sugar factories capable of making maple sugar or syrup but the 
association was concerned that it wasn’t meeting its potential, and there was money to be 
made (Lefebvre 1916, p. 20). It wished to ‘do the same for the [maple] sugar industry as for 
dairy and cattle breeding.’ (Lefebvre 1916.)   In an impassioned speech at their 1916 meeting 
the Member of Parliament for Vaudreuil, Gustave Boyer, reminded the assembly that ‘the 
essential condition for reaching the desired success quickly is the community: cooperation of 
goodwill and ideas’ (Lefebvre 1916). The advantages to the working or ‘agricultural classes’ 
were emphasised: ‘In any section of the industrial world, when the success of the working 
classes was desired, the first thing was to unite in a body, and the latter then, championing all, 
would begin the struggle.’ (Lefebvre 1916).    
Part of the struggle with maple products, then, was to improve output and stamp out 
adulteration. One strategy to meet these threats was to improve the quality of maple sugar and 
maple syrup by introducing grades and standards, and modernising equipment, as a way to 
protect both producer and consumer from the ‘speculator and middle man’ because as many 
advocates for pure maple sugar knew, pounds would magically get added to the product as it 
flowed into cities (Spencer 1913, p. 56). 
 
Adulteration and purity  
The declining productivity of the maple syrup industry was very much linked to the ‘devilish’ 
and ‘evil’ problem of adulteration and concerns over product quality (Grimm 1911). 
Although the nineteenth century heyday of adulteration was quelled somewhat by pure food 
laws in both the US (1906) and Canada (1874), it was still in fashion well into the twentieth 
century. Products which were not necessarily injurious to health, but still misleading, such as 
adding yellow to margarine to mask as butter (and thereby offering a cheaper alternative) 
paralleled some of the debates and concerns found among producers in the maple industry 
(Dupré 1999; Heick 1991).  At the end of the nineteenth century, glucose could be had at less 
than two cents a pound, granulated sugar at four cents a pound, while syrup sold direct from 
producers at about one dollar per gallon. It was hard to argue against the cheaper alternative 
offered to consumers through compound or flavoured products, and with competing sweet 
options on the market such as glucose, molasses and cane sugar, one way to position maple 
sugar and syrup was that as a ‘luxury item’ for ‘discriminating customers’ (Spencer 1913, p 
45).  But as the Canadian Deputy Minister of Agriculture warned British enquirers about the 
state of Canadian maple products, it was ‘difficult for most of the manufacturers to withstand 
the temptation [to adulterate].’ (Parmelee 1898).    
Maple sugar could be easily mixed with cheaper cane or beet sugar, or other powdery 
substances, such as chalk or Blanc d’Espagne, a calcium carbonate and clay powder mixture 
(Lefevbre, 1916). Maple syrup could be mixed with darker grades or water, or in some cases 
molasses (Grimm 1911). Some mixers created a compound using an alternative substance 
called ‘mapeleine’ (maple flavour) that, when one ounce was mixed with a gallon of 
molasses, produced a so-called ‘delicious syrup’ (Grimm 1911, p. 4). A series of 
investigations conducted by the Department of Inland Revenue’s Chief Dominion Analyst 
Thomas MacFarlane in 1906 and again in 1908 at the point of retail sale showed that the 
samples taken by inspectors found adulteration to be rampant. In 1906, of 85 maple syrups 
sampled from the four main provinces (but selling products originating and processed by 
manufacturers in both the US and Canada), only 22 were ‘genuine’, 2 ‘doubtful’, 8 had 
‘declared adulteration’ on the label, and 53 were found to be adulterated; of the 26 maple 
sugars, only 11 were found to be ‘genuine’ (MacFarlane 1906).  
Inspection of samples was governed under the remit of the Adulteration Act. The 
cooperative, however, felt it didn’t go far enough to protect maple products, and the 3200-
strong membership petitioned the Minister of Agriculture to provide greater regulatory 
protection which would require analysts to confirm the sugar content of so-called ‘maple 
products’ (Grimm 1911, p. 20). The minister argued that it was too difficult to test but 
Grimm, one of the Coop’s directors, argued that at the manufacturing plants it was possible.   
Producers were selling their product increasingly less and less direct to consumers and 
instead going through powerful wholesalers, factories and retailers such as George Cary in 
Vermont, the Imperial Syrup Co. in Montreal, or The New England Maple Sugar Co. in 
Boston, or, the Québec Maple Sugar Producers’ Society established its first plant and 
warehouse in Plessisville (MacFarlane 1906). The advent of large bulk transport barrels made 
this possible; these could be loaded up at the farms’ sugar shacks and shipped by freight train 
to cities like Montreal or similar cities south of the border where wholesalers and retailers 
congregated. Although the barrels helped facilitate and create new market opportunities for 
producers, they also caused problems as these were uninspected and ungraded at both the 
point of collection and at the wholesalers, leaving much room for mislabelling or mixing of 
its contents. Producers and farmers committed to selling a pure product were being 
undermined; power had thus come to rest in the hands of the manufacturers and wholesalers, 
the ‘mixers’ as some cynically referred to these actors further along the maple product supply 
chains (Spencer 1913, p. 46).   
The cooperatives fought back against this development. Drawing on its collective 
marketing and bargaining power, it sought to improve the overall quality, provide education 
and create standards. The Québec producers created its own set of grades for sugar: ‘Choice’, 
No. 1, No. 2 and No. 3, each in increasing darkness and robust flavour.  No. 2 and 3 would be 
used for making sugar for baking, or sent to the tobacco industry for mixing with cigarettes 
(Québec Maple Sugar Producers 1920, p. 10).  
A powerful figure that emerged during this time was John Grimm, who, as mentioned 
above, was one of the five first Directors of the Pure Maple Sugar and Syrup Co-operative 
Agricultural Association, and owner of Grimm Manufacturing in Montreal – a maker of 
industrial maple sugar and syrup processing equipment such as evaporators.    In addition to 
passionately preaching against the existence of ‘bogus maple syrups and sugars’, improving 
quality and establishing grades, he was also a strong advocate for collective marketing of 
maple sugar and syrup (Grimm 1911).   In 1913 Grimm organized a maple sugar and syrup 
contest in Montreal and strongly lobbied the federal government for the need for greater 
legislation. (Spencer 1913, p.57).   The collective petitioned the federal government to 
establish an Act that would govern the maple syrup industry, and enshrine specifications and 
definitions of the word maple in the rule of law.  Eventually, after consultation on a draft with 
people like Grimm, tobacco manufacturers (invested in the darker grade sugar for their 
products), the coops and retailers, the Maple Sugar Industry Act (and its regulations) came 
into force in 1931.  
Strict specifications were to become enshrined in the Act.  Overall, all grades of syrup 
had to weigh 13lbs 2 ounces per gallon and contain no more than 35 per cent water.  ‘Canada 
Fancy’ was very light amber or straw coloured with a characteristic maple flavour, free from 
any fermentation; ‘Canada Light’ was light amber and straw coloured; ‘Canada medium’ was 
to be slightly darker amber or straw and finally, ‘Canada Dark’ was darker in colour than 
medium and (unlike the other 3 grades) trace fermentation or ‘sappiness’ flavour was 
permitted (Department of Agriculture 1931, Section 12). Sugar grades were also similarly 
defined and graded in the Act: all must consist of entirely solid or pulverised product 
resulting from the evaporation of maple sap or syrup and contain no more than 10% water, 
each with a designation of either ‘Canada Light’, ‘Canada Medium’ and ‘Canada Dark’. 
(Department of Agriculture 1931, Section 13 (1)).  
Despite the Act in force as of 1931, the maple industry continued to be ‘menaced!’ as 
the Act wasn’t being properly enforced, and adulterated products continued to flow through 
the supply chains. Again, this caused more crisis, as an anonymous bulletin featuring 
Grimm’s visage prominently on the front page and seemingly aimed at consumers and 
producers screamed out headlines that ‘55,000 Canadian farmers [were] being robbed of a 
real asset’ and it was the fault of the department of health for not inspecting and testing 
enough samples and enforcing the law (Maple Industry Is Menaced 1928). The anonymous 
author of this bulletin appeared to have great insider industry knowledge and connections to 
the point of even being able to have placed on one occasion a sample of adulterated maple 
sugar directly in the hands of the Minister of Health, a ‘black, grimy, rank to the 
taste…dreadful apology for maple product.’ (Maple Industry is Menaced 1928). At the time 
the industry was valued at eight million dollars per annum; adulteration meant money was 
being lost, farmers and consumers were continuing to be ‘swindled’ and cheated and the 
whole industry was ‘undermined’ by adulteration (Maple Industry is Menaced 1928).    
The Cooperatives called upon producers to lobby the government and MPs and 
demand that the regulations be enforced and more inspectors get trained up and sent out; they 
appealed to a sense of national unity and pride and that taking action meant to ‘be a builder-
up, not a tearer-down of Canada.’ (Maple Industry is Menaced 1928).  Part of the problem 
was finding suitable inspectors. Many inspectors and analysts from the government Fruit 
Branch were enlisted, but few had the expertise in maple products to identify and test for real 
or fake products out in the field or the sugar groves. Tests had been developed thanks to a 
strong research program emanating from Montreal and McGill University into the science of 
maple products, but weren’t in widespread use. Testing for adulteration by cane or other 
sugars was tricky because the same constituent components found in granulated sugar was 
identical to the pure sugar components of maple syrup (Snell 1913, p. 740). Testing for other 
components unique to maple syrup such as malic acid as well as for alkaline values of ash 
(the remaining inorganic components once the organic parts have been burnt off), along with 
lead values, or the ‘lead test’ were some of the ways for an analyst to determine if a maple 
product had been adulterated (Snell 1913, p. 740).  It was tricky, however, and few analysts 
had training in these techniques and methods of detection as tests were still being developed 
by agricultural chemists.   Moreover, inspectors were only learning about the differences in 
the new established grades.  Part of the problem was also the point of inspection. As Grimm 
argued, testing at the site of production was not enough:  it was a much better idea to test at 
the site of the wholesalers and retailers where mixing would be more likely to occur (Grimm 
1929).  The Minister of Agriculture assured Vaillaincourt of the Québec coop that he was 
working on finding ‘a capable research man’ (Grisdale, 1928). 
Once again the Cooperation launched a powerful lobby to the Canadian federal 
government, in conjunction with equivalent organizations in New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, 
Québec and Ontario, petitioning for stricter controls on maple syrup purity and stricter fines 
for adulteration, better capacity for inspection and enforcement.  Requesting graders for 
syrups produced by ‘dealers’ (wholesalers) each spring in order to ‘protect both the farmer 
and purchasers’ (Vaillaincourt 1936). The federal government sent inspectors from their fruit 
branch to do surprise ‘bush inspections’, but many producers argued that more could be done 
at the packing, wholesaling and retail levels (Gardiner 1936). The cooperatives pushed for 
more:  The New Brunswick Maple Sugar Producers Association passed a resolution 
requesting that the Act be revised to insist that 4 grades be mandatory on labels for inter-
provincial trade; once Québec cooperatives got involved with the lobbying, the federal 
government responded with revisions to the Act (Clark 1936).   
Meanwhile, as the Canadian industry headed toward stricter purity, grades and 
standards, south of the border Grimm’s equally vociferous counterpart, if not a foil in this 
maple syrup drama, was the wholesaler George Cary, of Cary Maple Sugar Company in 
Vermont. At the time the largest ‘dealer in the world’ and ‘preacher for purity’ Cary wrote to 
the Canadian Minister of Agriculture suggesting that Canadian farmers were in the ‘habit of 
cheating’ and insisted that there wasn’t a demand for the lighter grades among consumers 
(Cary 1928). He also criticized the ‘attitude’ of the Cooperative in Québec and Plessisville 
for ‘hurting’ the industry. The Cooperative had begun to also subsidize producers, which 
Cary said forced him to buy up cheap Canadian products (and re-sell these) just to remain 
competitive. Cary said that Canadian pure products were far ‘too cheap’ and even lobbied the 
House of Representatives in the US to raise the tariff on Canadian maple sugar to ten cents 
per pound, and on syrup to six cents per pound (Montreal Daily Star 1929).   
The ‘preacher of purity’ was, somewhat ironically, caught up in litigation with Maine 
producers, and evidence showed he in fact supplied them with cane sugar so that they could 
adulterate their maple products (Payne 1928).  In the wake of this threat from an American 
increase on maple duties, Grimm felt this was an opportunity for Canadian farmers to ‘clean 
up a little bit’ and make a quality of sugar ‘better than the class of sugar that Cary likes to 
ship to the US.’ (Grimm 1929). Grimm wrote to the federal minister of agriculture suggesting 
the need to ‘help ourselves and help the farmer’ and ‘obtain a market for maple syrup and 
sugar at home.’ (Grimm 1929).  Because of the problems outlined by Grimm, namely the lack 
of enforcement of the new maple industry regulations, the looming US tariff rise and 
inevitable drop in exports, the Minister of Agriculture and Deputy Minister agreed that 
something had to be done to avert another maple industry crisis; Martin urged that it was time 
that ‘we must foster the sale of the pure product among our own people’ (Martin 1929).  As 
one producer put it, ‘it has been suggested that we advertise in England, why not work our 
own country first?’ (Jenne 1928).   
 
Marketing of maple products  
By the mid-1930s, with the legislative clout of the new maple sugar act, the Québec 
producers lobbied the Canadian federal department of Agriculture as well as the department 
of trade to help with the marketing of products both at home and abroad. The harvest in 1934 
and 1935 was particularly heavy and producers were ‘flooded’ in syrup (Pryce 1935).  
Having taken the stand for purity against their American counterparts, Canadian producers 
with the support of the federal government, embarked upon an ambitious advertising 
campaign to promote maple syrup and sugar products to domestic audiences. There were still 
calls for finding markets in the US and well as overseas in the United Kingdom, however the 
more expensive cost of Canadian sugar put British consumers off (Skinner 1935).  
The marketing of maple syrup began in earnest in the 1920s, led predominantly by the 
large collective of Québec Maple Sugar Producers’ Society, but with support from their 
provincial and national counterparts. The messaging involved telling the story of the 
production process, the maple groves, the flowing of the sap and the general romance of the 
sugar bush and maple harvesting season, especially the ‘sugaring off’ parties where the 
‘amorous instincts of the budding youths’ might be awakened (Spencer 1913, p. 12; 
Vaillaincourt 1927, pp. 3-7).  A nutrition and health angle was used to market maple products 
as being ‘pure’ sugar as opposed to the cheaper ‘refined’ cane sugar or molasses.  Maple 
sugar and syrup was presented as being more calorific and hence of higher value with a total 
of 75 calories in one tablespoon, as opposed to 63 calories in cane sugar or molasses, or 57.5 
cal in corn syrup (Maple Sugar Producers of Québec 1920, p. 13).  It was also marketed as a 
good source of iron which would be of benefit to ‘anaemic persons’ (Maple Sugar Producers 
of Québec 1920, p. 14).   
In 1934 the federal government agreed to spend $5000 toward a marketing campaign 
which would result in a series of adverts in popular magazines and papers across the country, 
special displays at railway stations, and educational events aimed at schools, such as maple 
syrup ‘essay writing contests’ (Adams 1934; and see Figure 2). As part of this campaign, the 
healthfulness of maple syrup was invoked as a reason to make it a part of a child’s ‘daily diet’ 
as the ‘safe sweet for children’ which was also good for them (See Figure 3). Moreover, 
maple products were to be trusted as they were pure and protected by the Dominion 
Government, with quality guaranteed from ‘the tapped tree to your table’ (See Figure 3).   
The cooperatives also enlisted the help of housewives and womens’ institutes to contribute 
ideas on how to use maple products in the home. Maple recipes were distributed in short 
pamphlets containing photos and instructions on how to construct an array of maple-based 
delights such as maple blanc-mange, maple candied rice, maple peanut brittle, and prunes in 
maple syrup (Maple Sugar Producers of Québec 1920). Consumer feedback and tastes, 
however, started to show a preference toward syrup moreso than the hard and awkward sugar 
blocks, whom some felt resembled ‘common laundry soap’ and couldn’t compete with 
chocolate bars retailing at 75 cents to a dollar in the shops (Adams 1934).  Gradually the 
coarse, dark, unattractive blocks of maple ‘cement’ started to make way for the more 
luxurious, fine and pure maple syrup.   
 
Conclusion  
The collective marketing of maple syrup by powerful cooperative groups continued 
throughout the rest of the twentieth century, and from the 1930s onward Canada began to 
eclipse the US in terms of worldwide production.  By the 1960s, maple sugar as a product 
almost disappeared entirely and producers focused mainly on syrup, although some niche 
gourmet products have been developed or retained. The Federation of Québec Maple Syrup 
Producers was officially established in 1966, and in 1975 the International Maple Syrup 
Institute (ISMI) was created to represent cross-border interests of Canadian and American 
producers. Québec produces approximately 80% of the world supply, and, to consolidate its 
strength, the Federation has continued to expand its global collective marketing campaign, 
which resulted in the creation of a maple flavour wheel in 2004, and in 2017 the construction 
at a national level of a revised and rebranded new set of ‘4 Grades’ based on translucence and 
each with associated flavour profiles, all designed to invoke a unique Québec maple terroir 
(Moriniaux 2007).   A high level of consumer protection has been established, although the 
benefits of maple syrup may be more culinary than healthy.  But what about the protection 
for farmers, the ‘agricultural classes’ and the norms and values established and embedded 
within these powerful networks at the start of the twentieth century?  Although a smaller heist 
occurred in 2016, the FPAQ has recently confirmed that the quota system is being revisited to 
improve benefits for producers, and it is looking to expand production by adding five million 
taps after a record season in 2017 (FPAQ, 2018).   
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